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HOW DO I LOVE THEE, LET ME COUNT THE DAYS: DEATHBED 
MARRIAGES IN AMERICA 
Terry L. Turnipseed*
“It was early evening on August 18 when they gathered at the bedside 
of legendary Washington tycoon Herbert H. Haft, who lay in a glass-
enclosed cubicle in the second-floor intensive care unit of Sibley 
Memorial Hospital. Wearied by age and illness, Haft, 83, was 
jaundiced from liver failure, his weakened heart maintained a feeble 
beat and his kidneys no longer functioned. Short and pugnacious, the 
white-haired millionaire and former Wall Street terror who stood just 
over five feet tall now seemed shrunken and frail against the expanse 
of his hospital bed. He had just two weeks to live, but those who had 
assembled amid monitors, IV tubes and other hospital machinery that 
muggy Wednesday hadn't come to say farewell. They were there to 
see Haft marry. His fiancée, Myrna C. Ruben, 69, wearing an elegant 
new pink suit, looked nervous as a judge intoned, "Repeat after me." 
The wedding ceremony lasted about 15 minutes. There was no cake. 
Then the groom stayed behind as his bride headed out for dinner with 
their friends. They threw flowers as she sat down in the restaurant.”1
I. Introduction  
Should you be able to marry someone who has only days to live? If so, should the 
government award the surviving spouse the many property rights that ordinarily flow 
from such a marriage?  
Herbert Haft had to know that he had only days to live when he married Myrna 
Ruben from his hospital bed three years ago in Washington, D.C. Why, then, would he 
marry? Did he even know he was getting married? Even if he did understand and 
acquiesce in it, was he capable at that moment of understanding the property 
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1 Michael E. Ruane, Caroline E. Mayer and Carol D. Leonnig, Family Feud Reaches Beyond Grave,
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consequences of marriage? The first priest Myrna contacted refused to perform the 
ceremony2 - why?  
If this gives you a queasy3 feeling, think about how Herbert Haft's children felt. When 
Herbert's daughter got wind that her father, worth an estimated fifty million dollars,4 was 
going to marry while he lay dying in intensive care, she was appalled and went to court to 
obtain an injunction against the marriage.5 The probate judge assigned to the case ordered 
a court-appointed professional to pay Herbert a visit to see whether he had the capacity to 
enter into marriage. But, alas, the wheels of justice turn slowly in the Probate Division of 
the District of Columbia Superior Court (as is the case in many state probate courts), and 
Haft was married by the time the court's agent could get to Sibley Hospital.6 Haft died 
exactly two weeks after his marriage.7
The logical legal next step for Haft's children would have been to challenge the 
validity of the marriage, or at least the property rights awarded Haft's blushing bride. So, 
they perhaps were about to do just that when they likely discovered something seemingly 
peculiar about District of Columbia law: the only person allowed to challenge the validity 
of a marriage (or, by extension, the property consequences thereof) after the death of one 
of the spouses is the surviving spouse!8 Seems incredible does it not? The heirs of a dying 
man (or woman) who marries on his (or her) deathbed cannot challenge the marriage 
post-death. Ironically, the one person allowed to challenge is the only person who has 
absolutely no motivation to do so.  
But, you ask, surely that must be simply some oddity of District of Columbia law? 
No. That appears to be the rule in virtually every American jurisdiction that has 
 
2 Id.
3 Deathbed marriages have been a symbol of unprincipled behavior for a long time. Appendix 1 
contains a wonderful and intricate Harper's Weekly cartoon from 1872. 
4 Ruane, supra note 1. 
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 226 (1934) (District of Columbia case: voidable marriage 
cannot be annulled after the death of either spouse) (citing Sammons v. Sammons, 46 W.L.R. 39, 41 
(S.C.D.C.); Tyler v. Andrews, 40 App. D.C. 100, 104 (1913); Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App. D.C. 216, 218, 
219, 19 F.2d. 690, 692, 693 (1927); Abramson v. Abramson, 60 App. D.C. 119, 121, 122, 49 F.2d. 501, 
503, 504 (1931)); see also Norris v. Harrison, 198 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (step-grandchildren of a 
decedent would not have standing to maintain action to annul marriage of decedent). 
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expressed an opinion on the subject.9 How did this rule come about? What, if anything, 
should we do to change it? Given the Supreme Court's rhetoric over the years hailing 
one's “fundamental right” to marry,10 how far can we as a society really go to restrict the 
ability of someone, even on her deathbed, to marry?  
This article will explore these and other related questions, and will propose a 
theoretical framework for a model act that would allow heirs and beneficiaries standing 
to sue to negate the property consequences that flow from a marriage, depending on the 
level of mental capacity at the time of the marriage. 
II. Property Consequences of Marriage  
There are multiple property consequences that flow from a marriage. These vary 
substantially from state to state, but can be generalized by separate and community 
property jurisdictions.  
A. Separate Property Jurisdictions 
Forty-one states have separate property regimes.11 Below are some of the property 
rights that come with marriage in these states. 
9 See generally JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., Understanding Family Law, chapter 2 (Third Edition, 
LexisNexis); see also discussion infra Part IV.  
10 See discussion infra Part V. 
11 Marital property regimes are classified as either community property or separate property. Only nine 
states currently have a system of community property: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1998)), 
California (CAL. [FAM.] CODE § 760 (West 2004)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (2003)), Louisiana 
(LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (1985)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (LexisNexis 1989)), 
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2 (LexisNexis 1978)), Texas (TEX. [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 3.002 
(Vernon 1998)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 2000)), and Wisconsin (WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 766.001 (West 2001)). Alaska allows spouses to choose whether to be subject to community 
or separate property (ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.030 (1998)). JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 423 (7th ed. 2005). These community property states, however, represent over one-fourth of the 
United States population. Id. As summarized by Dukeminier:  
Community property in the United States is a community of acquests: 
Husband and wife own the earnings and acquisitions from earnings of 
both spouses during marriage in undivided equal shares. Whatever is 
bought with earnings is community property. All property that is not 
community property is the separate property of one spouse or the other 
or, in the case of a tenancy in common or joint tenancy, of both. 
Separate property includes property acquired before marriage and 
property acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance. In Idaho, 
Louisiana, and Texas, income from separate property is community 
property. In the other community property states, income from separate 
property retains its separate character. 
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1. Elective Share 
In all but one of these states,12 often the primary right obtained in conjunction with 
marriage is the so-called right of election against the will encompassed in elective share 
statutes.13 Even if there is a valid will, the surviving spouse is allowed to elect, in a 
typical state, one-third of the decedent-spouse's property if the decedent had surviving 
issue, or one-half if there were no surviving issue.14 
Obviously, then, even if the decedent spouse had proper testamentary capacity at the 
moment of executing an otherwise valid will, then that will may well be defeated in large 
part by a deathbed marriage, and the elective share rights that come with it. 
2. Surviving Spouse Share Under Intestacy 
If a decedent spouse died without a valid will, she is deemed to have died intestate.15 
Every jurisdiction has default provisions that specify who is to get what share of an 
intestate decedent's property. Surviving spouses generally receive at least one-third to 
one-half of the decedent's property.16 
3. Other State Law Property Rights 
There are several other rights bestowed on surviving spouses by state law. Again, 
these vary quite a bit, but include: the family allowance amount (generally a fixed 
 
. . . .
Almost all community property states follow the theory that husband 
and wife own equal shares in each item of community property at 
death.  
Id. at 455, 457. Separate property states are simply states that do not have a community property system.  
12 Georgia is the only state that does not have dower/curtesy, a statutory elective share, or community 
property concepts. Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn't I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to Whomever I 
Choose At My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving the French), Brandeis Law 
Journal at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law, 44 B.L.J. 737, 739, (2006) (citing Jeffrey 
N. Pennell, Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, 32 U. MIAMI L. CENTER EST. PLAN. § 904 
(1998)). 
13 For a detailed discussion of the history and current workings of the elective share, see generally 
Turnipseed, supra note 12. 
14 Id., at Part III.  
15 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 59. 
16 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 62-64.  
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amount or the amount necessary to support the surviving family members for a year);17 
placing valuable property in a tenancy by the entirety;18 the homestead allowance (to 
ensure the family home passes to the surviving spouse free of encumbrances);19 and the 
exempt personal property set-aside (to ensure that certain tangible personal property 
passes to the surviving spouse).20 
5. Federal Property Rights 
The federal government affords surviving spouses numerous property and tax-related 
rights including: a one hundred percent estate tax deduction for transfers to United States 
citizen spouses;21 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) protection for 
qualified retirement plans (surviving spouses must have survivorship rights if the 
employee-spouse predeceases, and spouses can only waive this right in writing and not 
via a premarital agreement);22 and Social Security spousal survivor benefits.23 In all, 
these benefits can be quite substantial.  
B. Community Property Jurisdictions 
Most of the rights listed above apply to community property jurisdictions as well, 
with the notable exception of the elective share right. The latter is not present in a 
community property jurisdiction presumably because the concept of community property 
is intended to protect the surviving spouse adequately. Surviving spouses in community 
property jurisdictions would, generally, receive less of the decedent's property than their 
separate property counterparts in situations where the marriage is short-lived. This is 
because the “community” (the property brought in during the marriage) would be 
relatively small, and the surviving spouse is only guaranteed a split of the community 
 
17 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 422; Verner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth 
Transmission Process: The Surviving Spouse, Years Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 
468 (1975-1976); see, e.g., Unif. Probate Code § 2-404(a) (amended 1993) (granting a reasonable 
allowance that cannot continue beyond a year if the estate is inadequate to pay creditors).  
18 See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 84, 145-46 
(1994).  
19 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 421-22.  
20 Id. at 422. 
21 See Brashier, supra note 18, at 140-41; Pennell, supra note 12, § 905; MARY ANN GLENDON, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 239 (1989) (“tax law (which can be decisive for the estate planning of 
the well-to-do) increasingly encourages dispositions in favor of the surviving spouse by giving such 
dispositions preferred treatment”); Chaffin, supra note 17, at 465. 
22 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 420-21; Pennell, supra note 12, § 905. See generally 
Chaffin, supra note 17, at 465-67. Is it odd that Congress has chosen to step into this debate only with 
respect to qualified plans?  
23 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 419-20; Chaffin, supra note 17, at 465-67. 
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property, not the decedent's separate property if she has a valid will that channels that 
property elsewhere.24 
III. After the Death of One Putative Spouse, Deathbed Marriages are Voidable, not 
Void – Why?  
A. Generally 
Conceivably, one could challenge a marriage based on a number of grounds: 
improper age, the parties are too closely related, mental incompetence (either permanent 
or temporary), bigamy, lack of consent (including lack of ability to consent), fraud, 
duress, and undue influence just to name a few.25 In ancient and modern times, some of 
the above challenges have made the marriage void and some have made the marriage 
voidable.26 The distinction between the two is important to an understanding of who may 
contest the validity of the marriage and when they may do so, i.e., the standing rules 
surrounding annulment proceedings.  
Marriages deemed to be void (or void ab initio27) are legal nullities that, in theory, 
never existed in the first place.28 In modern times in the United States, examples of 
grounds that lead to marriages being deemed void include: bigamous or polygamous 
marriages; same sex marriages in most states; incestuous marriages; and marriages that 
include one or more underage persons (the last is void only in a minority of 
jurisdictions).29 The putative spouse, the State, or any interested third party may 
collaterally attack a marriage on grounds that render it void.30 These attacks may be made 
even after the death of one or both spouses.31 
24 See generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 455-458. 
25 See, e.g., WILLIAM P. STATSKY, FAMILY LAW, 181 (2d ed. 1984).  
26 Id. at 181-99. 
27 Literally “from the beginning” in Latin. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Fourth Edition, 2000) by Houghton Mifflin Company.
28 GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 49; see also Annotation, Marriage of Mental Incompetent as Void 
or Voidable, L.R.A. 1916C, 691 (1919) (“a marriage is termed void when it is good for no other legal 
purpose, and its invalidity may be maintained in any proceeding in any court, between any parties, whether 
in the lifetime or after the death of the supposed husband and wife and whether the question arises directly 
or collaterally”); see also STATSKY, supra note 25, at 179-80. 
29 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 50; see also STATSKY, supra note 25, at 181-99. 
30 Id. 
 
31 Id. 
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Marriages deemed to be voidable are valid for all civil purposes, unless attacked in an 
annulment proceeding by one of the putative spouses.32 Examples of grounds that lead to 
marriages being deemed voidable include: fraud; duress; mental incompetence (either 
permanent or temporary); undue influence; sham; jest; and underage (voidable in a 
majority of jurisdictions).33 In general, because only the husband or wife can challenge a 
voidable marriage, neither a third party nor the State may bring a proceeding to deem it 
invalid, even after the death of one of the spouses.34 This right to attack a marriage with a 
voidable-type defect has, historically, been seen as a personal right maintainable only by 
a party to the marriage contract, or at worst by a guardian ad litem in an instance where 
both spouses are alive but one is under a legal disability.35 
32 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 50; see also L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 691 (“a voidable 
marriage may be defined generally as one between parties having capacity to contract marriage, but in the 
constitution of which there is an imperfection, in that it is forbidden by law, which imperfection can be 
inquired into only during the lifetime of both of the parties in a proceeding instituted for the very purpose 
of obtaining a sentence declaring it null”); see also STATSKY, supra note 25, at 179-80. 
33 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 50; see also, STATSKY, supra note 25, at 181-99. Note that 
older common law rules were different in some instances. For example, marriages annulled because of 
mental incompetence were void, not voidable, under common law. L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 700, 
700-01; see also Johnson v. Sands, 53 S.W.2d 929 (1932) (marriage of one so lacking in mental capacity at 
time as to be incapable of entering into marriage contract void from inception; heirs could sue after death to 
set aside). Most states now have statutes that provide the marriage of mentally incompetent individuals to 
be voidable only, though a minority of jurisdictions hold otherwise. GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 59. 
In general, modern statutes are moving more categories of marriage defects from the void to the voidable 
characterization. L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 692. A thorough discussion follows infra Part IV. 
 
34 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 50; see also 4 AM. JUR. 2D Annulment of Marriage §61 (2004) 
(a third person cannot maintain an action to annul a marriage which is merely voidable). 
35 Irwin J. Schiffres, Annulment of Marriage; Action for Annulment; Parties; Generally, 4 Am Jur 2d 
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE § 61 (2004). 
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The chart below summarizes the general standing rules in the United States as they 
exist today. These rules are discussed in detail in Part IV, infra.
PARTIES WITH STANDING 
TO BRING ANNULMENT 
ACTION 
WHEN MUST AN ANNULMENT 
ACTION BE BROUGHT 
suit based on annulment 
grounds resulting in a 
void marriage 
putative spouse, the State, 
or any interested third 
party 
anytime, even after the death of 
one or both putative spouses 
(subject to the relevant statute 
of limitations) 
suit based on annulment 
grounds resulting in a 
voidable marriage 
either putative spouse, but 
generally no one else 
some states allow other 
interested parties to sue 
before the death of either 
putative spouse 
for putative spouses, anytime, 
even after the death of one 
spouse 
for interested third parties, some 
states allow suits prior to the 
death of either putative spouse 
almost no state allows suits by 
interested third parties after one 
of the putative spouses dies 
in any case, suit is subject to the 
relevant statute of limitations 
Likely you have noted that all of the common grounds that might be used to attack a 
deathbed marriage – such as temporary mental incompetence due to illness, undue 
influence, fraud, duress or a combination thereof – fall into the voidable category, thus 
making it impossible for a decedent-spouse's heir to challenge a marriage (and thereby 
the property consequences of a marriage).  
Should this be the case? Perhaps there are very good reasons for these very old-school 
categories and we should not upset them. Let us just see about that. 
B. Why This Distinction Between Marriages That Are Void and Voidable? 
Modern American law seems to classify marriage defects as either void or voidable 
based upon some perceived “seriousness of the marital defect.”36 The categorization of 
marital defects as either void or voidable began its existence in a significantly less 
defensible manner. 
Deathbed marriages have been around for quite some time, probably since shortly 
after marriages began. The term “deathbed marriage” dates back to the Middle English 
 
36 GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 49. 
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term “deethbed.”37 “Deathbed” first appeared in print in the epic poem Beowulf (c. 
1400).38 It appeared in books three more times in the 16th century and was used by 
Shakespeare in 1604 in the play Othello.39 However, it was not until John Norris’s 
Practical Discourses Upon the Beatitudes that the word "deathbed" became associated 
with the notion of a belated change of conduct, as in Norris’s “deathbed charity” and 
“deathbed repentance.”40 
The distinction between determining a marriage to be void or voidable goes back, as 
these things tend to do, to the differing approaches of old English ecclesiastical courts 
(applying canon law) and temporal courts (applying common law).41 Everything related 
to marriage and the dissolution of marriage initially rested exclusively with the Church.42 
The Church, over time, imposed ever-increasing impediments on marriage for the 
“corrupt” purpose of raising revenues by charging a special exemption fee in order to 
allow couples to marry, notwithstanding the fact that the marriage technically violated 
one or more Papal edicts.43 These increasing impediments became intolerable.44 
In response, under King Henry VIII, the Crown enacted a series of statutes granting 
temporal courts authority to prohibit the ecclesiastical courts from interfering with 
marriages, except for those with impediments specified by statute (civil disabilities).45 
These statutes gave no power to the temporal courts to determine if a marriage were 
valid, with the result that the power to avoid marriages continued exclusively with the 
ecclesiastical courts.46 
37 Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Random House, Inc. (2006). 
38 Oxford English Dictionary (1989). 
 
39 Id. (citing Othello V, ii, 51 (“Sweet Soule, take heed, take heed of Perjury, Thou art on thy death-
bed.”)). 
 
40 Id. (citing John Norris, Practical Discourses Upon the Beatitudes (vol. IV, 1707)). 
 
41 W.W. Allen, Right to Attack Validity of Marriage After Death of Party Thereto, 76 A.L.R. 769, § I 
(2004). Principally, canon law was an amalgamation of Papal decrees interpreted in a “book of institutes,” 
named the Corpus Juris Canonici, published in 1582 and revised in 1603. L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 
690. This book of institutes was binding only upon the clergy and ecclesiastical courts since the English 
Parliament had not adopted same. Id.
42 Allen, supra note 41, at § I. 
 
43 Allen, supra note 41, at § I.; L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 691. 
 
44 L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 691. 
 
45 Id. 
 
46 Id. 
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In time, there came to be a distinction between civil disabilities enforceable by 
temporal courts and canonical impediments enforceable by ecclesiastical courts.47 An 
adjudicated violation of one of the civil disabilities resulted in the marriage being made 
void: these actions could have been maintained in any proceeding, either direct or 
collateral, in any civil court, either before or after the death of either or both parties.48 
Civil disabilities, as stated by an English court in 1812, “do not put asunder those who are 
joined together, but they previously hinder the junction.”49 Further,  
civil disabilities . . . make the contract void ab initio, not 
merely voidable; these do not dissolve a contract already 
made; but they render the parties incapable of contracting 
at all: . . . and if any persons under these legal incapacities 
come together, it is a meretricious and not a matrimonial 
union, and, therefore, no sentence of avoidance is 
necessary.50 
Contrast that with an alleged violation of a canonical impediment to marriage in an 
ecclesiastical court, which were deemed voidable – actionable only in a direct proceeding 
(only by one of the spouses), and only during the lives of the parties.51 Once one of the 
spouses died, the marriage was valid forever since it was not declared invalid during the 
lives of both spouses.52 This was so, apparently, because ecclesiastical courts had 
jurisdiction only to “vindicate the divine law rather than to uphold property rights.”53 
Obviously, the surviving spouse retained all support and property rights relating to the 
marriage despite any apparent canonical violations.54 
Once Henry VIII's Church of England split from the traditional Catholic Church, no 
one could appeal to the Roman Pope to annul a marriage. At this time, English common 
law courts gained jurisdiction over actions yielding both void and voidable marriage 
declarations.55 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. 
 
49 Id. (citing Elliot v. Gurr (1812) 2 Phillim. Eccl. Rep. 16, 161 Eng. Reprint, 1064). 
 
50 L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 691. 
 
51 See generally R.H. Helmholz, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND (Hambledon Press, 1987); 
see also L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 691. 
 
52 L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 691. 
53 Id. 
 
54 GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 49. 
 
55 Id. 
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In modern England, a voidable marriage may be put in issue only by a party thereto 
and during the lifetime of both parties.56 Voidable grounds include a marriage where 
either party did not validly consent, e.g., if made under duress, mistake, unsoundness of 
mind or otherwise.57 
As discussed above in Part I.A., supra, the distinction still has very real meaning in 
modern America. Prior categorization of a marital defect – no matter how egregious and 
obvious in a given case – as voidable means that heirs are stopped cold on a per se basis 
from challenging the marriages of a mother, father, or other ancestor. Should this be the 
case, or is this just yet another lousy legal leftover from old English feuding between the 
Church and head of State?  
IV. Who Has Standing to Sue to Challenge the Validity of a Marriage?  
Marriage is something more than an ordinary contract affecting the 
property rights of the parties; it is an institution in which the public have 
an interest, and it may well be doubted as to whether the heirs of John 
Blackburn could be heard to question the legality of his marriage.58 
The most important threshold question in a marriage (or marital property rights) 
challenge is standing – who can get into court to sue? Clearly, if you cannot sue, then it 
does not matter in the least what the legal standards are, nor does it matter how egregious 
the facts of the case are: “you can't win if you don't play,” as the Powerball slogan goes.  
Modern statutes and cases uniformly provide that a marital challenge ground utilizing 
the standing rules of a voidable (not void) marriage may not be attacked after the death of 
either of the parties.59 In deathbed marriage cases, all but two or three states use these 
voidable standing rules with the result that, after the death of one of the putative spouses, 
no one but the surviving spouse has standing to challenge the marriage (and, by 
extension, the property rights flowing from same).60 
Recall that there are several marital defects that might be raised in a suit to annul a 
deathbed marriage (and thus negate the property rights consequences of same), including 
temporary mental incompetence due to illness, undue influence, fraud, duress, impotency 
 
56 See, e.g., A. v. B., L.R. 1 P & D 559 (Ct. of Probate 1868) (suit by next of kin of deceased wife). 
 
57 See S12 (c) & (d) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
58 Castor v. Davis, 120 Ind. 231 (1889). 
59 See generally, Allen, supra note 41, at § 2 (2004); see also Irwin J. Schiffres, Annulment of 
Marriage, 4 Am Jur 2d Annulment of Marriage § 61 (“a third person cannot, as a general rule, maintain an 
action to annul a marriage which is merely voidable”).  
60 See supra notes 69-71. 
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or some combination of these.61 One could imagine any or all of these grounds coming 
into play in the Herbert Haft situation mentioned in the opening (though of course we 
will never know because Herbert's heirs were not allowed to challenge the marriage).62 
Of all of the grounds on which deathbed marriages might be challenged, the most 
common is incompetence. A comprehensive statutory and common law review of 
standing, vis-à-vis incompetence, is detailed below to show how these suits (or, more 
appropriately, nonsuits) often play themselves out.  
Putative spouses must, of course, have the requisite mental capacity to get married.63 I 
have heard it joked that the level of mental capacity necessary to get married is roughly 
equivalent to that of a vegetable. For better or worse (no pun intended), this is not far 
from the truth. 
Generally, under common law, the burden of proof is on the party alleging the mental 
incapacity of a party to a marriage: in other words, a person is presumed to have capacity 
to marry.64 In a relative sense, the capacity required to marry is less than the capacity 
required to execute a will (testamentary capacity), which is less still than the capacity 
required to execute a contract or conduct business (for example, the capacity to execute 
an irrevocable trust).65 
MARITAL CAPACITY < TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY < CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY 
61 See, e.g., STATSKY, supra note 25, at 181-99. 
 
62 There have been many other infamous cases of deathbed marriages throughout history. One of the 
more interesting – detailed in Appendix 2 – is that of writer George Orwell who married Sonia Brownell, a 
woman fifteen years younger than Orwell. 
 
63 GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 49. 
 
64 Annotation, Mental Capacity to Marry, 28 A.L.R. 635 § IX (2004). 
65 GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 60.  
Even though a person might have been previously adjudged to be 
legally incompetent to handle his or her business affairs, nevertheless 
such a person might still be competent to marry, by applying a lesser 
test of competency for marriage than for other business purposes, again 
to validate the public policy of promoting marriage in general, and to 
validate the marital expectations of the parties in particular.  
See also, e.g., Park v. Park, [1954] P. 89 (1953) (decedent had capacity to marry but the will he executed 
the following day invalid for lack of testamentary capacity – wife gets intestate share); Payne v. Burdette,
84 Mo. App. 332 (1900) (a person may have sufficient mental capacity to contract a valid marriage, though 
he may not have mental capacity to contract generally).  
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The legal standards for the requisite marital capacity vary significantly from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction66 and their details are outside the scope of this article. Whether a suit to 
annul a marriage based on incompetence is governed by the void or voidable standing 
rules, however, is very much within this article's scope. For it is the void or voidable 
status that determines which parties have standing to sue and when. 
Generally under very old common law in the United States, a suit to annul a marriage 
due to incompetency was controlled by the void, not voidable, standing rules as to who 
could sue and when.67 This older rule is distinctly in the minority today.68 Most states 
now, either by statute69 or updated common law,70 treat incompetence as a cause of action 
 
66 Many courts tend to use the “capacity to understand the nature of the marital contract” and “capacity 
to understand the duties and responsibilities of marriage” tests. See, e.g., Homan v. Homan, 147 N.W.2d 
630 (Neb. 1967); Forbis v. Forbis, 274 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1955). Some courts use the less rigorous standard 
of “ability to consent at the time of the marriage” deleting the “additional duties or responsibilities” test. 
See, e.g., Young v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961). Any standard for incompetence, by its 
very nature, is obviously very subjective and cases tend to be quite fact specific. 
67 GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 59; see also L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 700-702. 
68 GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 59; see also L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 702-704; discussion 
supra notes 66-68. 
69 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 59; see also L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 702-704; 
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.041 (2006) (in Alaska, marriage cannot be challenged for any reason after the death 
of one of the parties); CAL. [FAM.] CODE §§ 2210 and 2211 (West 2006) (in California, action to annul a 
marriage on grounds of physical or mental incapacity, fraud or force is voidable only and must be brought 
during the life of the putative spouses); COLO .REV .STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10-111(2, 3) (West 2006) (in 
Colorado, children and other third parties may not attack the validity of a marriage after the death of one of 
the parties); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1506 (2006) (in Delaware, “in no event may a decree of annulment 
be sought after the death of either party”); Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 301(1) (“[i]n no event may a 
declaration of invalidity of marriage be sought after the death of either party to the marriage”); Indiana 
Code 31-11-9-2 (2006) (in Indiana, a “marriage is voidable if a party to the marriage was incapable because 
of . . . mental incompetency of contracting the marriage”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 403 (2006) (prohibiting 
"a contest of the validity of the acts of a person on account of insanity after the death of the person, unless 
his interdiction was pronounced or petitioned for prior to his death"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 5 
(West 2006) (in Massachusetts, marriage of incompetent can be attacked "only in a process instituted in the 
lifetime of both parties to test such validity"); N.J.STAT.ANN. § 62:1 (West 1931) (in New Jersey, 
marriages are valid until nullified by action by party to the marriage); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-4-2 (2006) (in 
North Dakota, action on grounds of physical or mental incapacity, fraud or force must be brought during 
the life of the putative spouses); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.32, 3105.32(C) (West 2006) (in Ohio, only 
party aggrieved may sue to have marriage annulled on grounds of mental incapacity or fraud); OR. REV.
STAT. § 106.030 (2006) (in Oregon, only the incompetent spouse can sue to invalidate a marriage); 1937 
Tenn. Pub. Acts, c. 81, § 3 (marriage of incompetent voidable only); TEX. [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 6.111 
(Vernon 2006) (a voidable marriage under Texas governing provisions is not subject to any challenge 
instituted after the death of either party); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.130 (2006) (in Washington, marriage 
"is voidable, but only at the suit of the party laboring under the disability, or upon whom the force or fraud 
is imposed"); and W. Va. Code, § 48-3-103 (2006) (all relevant grounds voidable, not void).  
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governed by the voidable rules, not the void rules. Research uncovered only two 
jurisdictions that clearly use the standing rules governing void, not voidable, marriages if 
mental incompetence or impairment is at issue in an annulment proceeding.71 
70 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 9, at 59; see also L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 702-704; In re 
Guthery's Estate, 226 Mo. App. 626 (1920) (decedent suffered a morning stroke, was married at 11 a.m., 
died at 7 p.m.: degree of capacity is irrelevant because marriage was merely voidable and could not be 
attacked by his administrator post-death); Dibble v Meyer, 280 P.2d 765 (Or. 1955) (marriage not subject to 
attack after the death of incompetent); Re Karau's Estate, 80 P.2d 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938) (marriage of 
incompetent held voidable, regardless of the degree of mental unsoundness, and thus not subject to attack 
after the decedent's death); Matter of Estate of Fuller, 862 P.2d 1037, 1038-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) 
(children of decedent spouse lacked standing to challenge validity of marriage on grounds of consent even 
when father was terminally ill during marriage); Hall v. Nelson, 534 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (son 
did not have standing to sue for annulment of father's marriage where marriage had taken place in hospital 
between father and live-in companion of 18 years, father had been hospitalized earlier that day because he 
had suffered massive coronary attack, and son brought complaint alleging lack of mental capacity and fraud 
after father's death about one month after marriage); Vance v Hinch, 261 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. 1953) (marriage 
of incompetent voidable and not subject to attack after her death); Re Romano's Estate, 246 P.2d 501 
(Wash. 1952) (marriage merely voidable when either party is incapable of consenting); In Succession of 
Baltimore, 176 So. 684 (La. Ct. App. 1937) (validity of marriage could not be attacked by anyone after 
death of one party unless petition filed before death); Bradford v Parker, 99 N.E.2d 537 (Mass. 1951) 
(challenge to marriage based on incompetency must be filed during lives of both parties to marriage and 
mere fact that a conservator had been appointed during lifetime is irrelevant); In Re De Conza's Estate, 177 
A. 847 (N.J. Misc. 1935) (marriage of incompetent is not void but voidable only); Bryant v Townsend, 221 
S.W.3d 949 (Tenn. 1949) (marriage of an insane person who had not been so adjudged was voidable only: 
right to attack the marriage subsequently died with the person); In re Estate of Santolino, 895 A.2d 506 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005) (decedent's sister could not prevail on claim that decedent's marriage was a 
nullity because decedent was impotent, as right was voidable and decedent's right to void marriage did not 
survive his death); In re Succession of Ricks, 2003-2580 La.App. 1 (2004) (right to demand the nullity of a 
marriage is personal to the spouse whose consent was not free and does not pass on to his heirs); Tabak v. 
Garay, 655 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (plaintiff's status as relative of deceased husband did not 
establish interest to void deceased husband's marriage to defendant wife, and plaintiff thus lacked standing 
to bring action); Arnelle v. Fisher, 647 So.2d 1047 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (validity of forty-one day 
marriage to terminally ill husband, which allegedly resulted from wife's undue influence, could not be 
attacked following death of husband and, thus, husband's cousin lacked standing to pursue annulment of 
allegedly voidable marriage); L.J. v. V.J., 6 Pa. D. & C.4th 363 (Pa. 1990) (marriages that are voidable may 
be annulled only by one of the parties to the marriage); Simpson v Neely, 221 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1949) (marriage of insane person voidable only, despite English common law to the contrary); Gibbons v. 
Blair, 376 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1985) (action to annul marriage on ground of fraud can only be brought by 
allegedly defrauded spouse while both parties to marriage are living); and Succession of Jene, 173 So.2d 
857 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (right to contest validity of marriage on grounds of lack of consent is strictly 
personal to contracting parties and does not pass to their heirs).  
71 In North Carolina: “All marriages between . . . persons either of whom is at the time incapable of 
contracting from want of will or understanding, shall be void”. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-3 (West 2006). 
In Kentucky, individuals adjudged as incompetent fall statutorily into the void category. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 402.020 West 2006). In Alabama, a 1979 case held that the administratrix of her deceased mother's 
estate could seek to annul her mother's marriage on the ground that the marriage was void because her 
mother was intoxicated from before the marriage until her death. Abel v. Waters, 373 So.2d 1125 (Ala. Civ. 
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States are split on the question of whether a marriage that can be challenged due to 
mental incapacity by a third party while the married couple is still alive (currently rarely 
allowed), can also be challenged by a third party after one or both of the married parties 
are dead.72 
A related question is the validity of a marriage when one or both of the parties is 
intoxicated, thus rendering a party incompetent in a temporary way. This temporary 
incompetence is similar in nature to some deathbed marriage situations where the 
individual has historically been competent but is rendered temporarily incompetent by 
illness. Intoxication usually renders a marriage voidable and not void.73 
Duress (or fraud) is the second leading ground for attacking a deathbed marriage. One 
might naturally think that if one party to a marriage were essentially forced to enter into a 
marriage – consent having been obtained by duress – it would be void given that consent 
would be very much lacking.74 Oddly, this is not the case. Although there are a small 
number of very old (pre-1905) state law cases supporting the void categorization, modern 
courts (and even most older United States courts) have consistently held duress to yield 
voidable, not void, marriages.75 
Many of the cases and most statutes mentioned above in relation to incompetence 
apply to duress and fraud as well. There appears, in fact, to be only one state 
 
App. 1979). New York has a unique rule that splits the ability to annul the marriage and the ability to defeat 
the property consequences of marriage. This rule is discussed later in Part VI and notes 111 and 112, infra.
72 Compare Dibble v Meyer, 280 P.2d 765 (Or. 1955) (suit by incompetent's guardian to annul the 
latter's marriage abated upon the death of the incompetent prior to the decree and could not be revived, for 
"the cause of suit" did not survive) with Quick v. Quick, 571 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (where 
complaint seeking declaration of invalidity of alleged incompetent's marriage was filed prior to alleged 
incompetent’s death, action survived death; term “sought” in statute providing that “[i]n no event may a 
declaration of invalidity of marriage be sought after the death of either party to the marriage” did not mean 
that an action commenced before death could not be pursued after death) and Clark v. Foust-Graham, 615 
S.E.2d 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (action to annul elderly husband's marriage to wife, initiated by husband's 
daughter as guardian at litem, could be maintained by guardian as estate's executrix following husband's 
death; action was commenced on husband's behalf prior to his passing, and substantial property rights 
hinged on the validity of the marriage).  
73 L.R.A. 1916C, supra note 28, at 703-704. 
74 Annotation, Marriage to Which Consent of One of Parties was Obtained by Duress as Void or Only 
Voidable, 91 A.L.R. 414, § I (2004). 
75 Id.; see also Robert C. Brown, Duress and Fraud as Grounds for the Annulment of Marriage, 10 
IND. L.J. 473 (1935) (generally held that neither fraud nor duress nor both together would make marriage 
void; thus fraud and/or duress not grounds for collateral attack). 
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(Pennsylvania) that, by statute, treats incompetence76 as rendering a marriage void, but 
fraud and duress as voidable.77 
So why might courts and legislatures have moved away from the void 
characterization seen in England and some very old American common law to the current 
and widespread voidable characterization? A typical answer comes from a 1922 Florida 
supreme court case Tyson v. State.78 In Tyson, the court held a marriage entered into 
under duress was voidable, not void.79 The reasons, the court said, were “obvious” that  
the legitimacy of children born of such marriages or of 
subsequent marriages of the parties and the inheritance of 
property which may be owned by them are among the 
cogent reasons for holding marriages attended by 
circumstances which may render their validity questionable 
as valid and binding until their invalidity is duly 
adjudicated.80 
In a deathbed marriage situation, though, it is highly unlikely that children will be 
“born of the marriage,” negating the logic in cases like Tyson (which was not a deathbed 
marriage case) for deathbed marriage situations. There is also less of a need in modern 
society to “legitimize” children born pre-marriage with a subsequent deathbed 
marriage.81 
76 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3304. 
 
77 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3305. I cannot imagine a rationale for treating duress and incompetence differently: 
to me, it makes no logical sense. Jurisdictions should either hold both to be void grounds or both to be 
voidable. 
78 90 So. 622 (Fla. 1922).  
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 In bygone eras (and in some cultures even today), it was of course quite important for children to be 
“legitimate.” Presumably, one instance where past deathbed marriages may have made some sense is the 
following: a man and woman were unmarried but had one or more children, and then with the death of one 
of the parties imminent, a marriage was performed in an attempt to legitimize past-born issue. An example 
of this was John Lyon-Bowes, the 10th Earl of Strathmore and Kinghorne, who had a “long affair with the 
commoner Mary Millner” that bore one son. Charles E. Hardy – John Bowes and the Bowes Museum 
(1970, reprinted 1982). The Earl married Mary on July 2, 1820, one day prior to his death. Id. This attempt 
to legitimize the son failed, as his primary title ended up passing to a younger male heir. Id.
For some of these illegitimate children, it was worth a high price indeed to legitimize his parents' 
union. Former infamous Venezuelan President Juan Vincente Gomez was reported to have “at least 50 
bastards,” though “no shotgun was ever big enough to make [him] marry.” Death of a Dictator, TIME 
MAGAZINE (December 30, 1935). Reportedly, one of his illegitimate children was shot while “attempting to 
stage a deathbed marriage for his mother.” Id.
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V. Fundamental Right to Marry 
The word “marriage” is not in the United States Constitution.82 Indeed, it says 
precious little about regulating domestic relations generally.83 These issues have 
traditionally been left to states.84 
This does not mean, of course, that the Supreme Court has not decided issues relating 
to marriage, including finding a “fundamental right to marry,” i.e., finding (and 
enforcing) a non-textual constitutional protection for marriage.85 The Court started this 
line of reasoning in 1877 with the pronouncement that there was a “common-law right” 
to marriage.86 During the height of the so-called Lochner87 era, the Court said: “Without 
doubt, [constitutionally-protected liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
 
82 Note that the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment would change this: “Marriage in the United 
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of 
any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.” The Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 40 
(2004). This proposed amendment is not expected to pass Congress, however, any time soon given the 
current number of Democratic seats in both Houses. 
83 The full faith and credit clause of United States Constitution Article IV § 1 – requiring states to 
credit the “public acts, records, and judicial proceedings” [including marriages] of each other – is regarded 
as the lone Constitutional provision relevant to domestic relations.  
84 See Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).  
One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined 
to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we observed 
that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, 
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of 
the United States” . . . .So strong is our deference to state law in this 
area that we have recognized a `domestic relations exception' that 
“divests the federal courts of power to issue divorcee, alimony, and 
child custody decrees.”  
See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 
(1992). 
85 For a very good summary of the Court's jurisprudence in this area, see Stephen L. Grose, A
Constitutional Analysis of Pennsylvania's Restrictions Upon Marriage, 83 DICK. L. REV. 94 (1979). 
86 Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76-81 (1877) (“Marriage is everywhere regarded as a civil contract. 
Statutes in many of the States, it is true, regulate the mode of entering into the contract, but they do not 
confer the right”). 
87 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”88 The Court went on to indicate 
in dicta that there surely could be some unconstitutional restrictions on marriage.89 
Even after the Lochner era, the “right to marry” language in Court opinions kept 
flowing. In 1942, Justice Douglas wrote: “We are dealing here with legislation which 
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to 
the very existence and survival of the race.”90 
Judicial decisions regarding marriage soon became entangled with privacy and 
reproduction jurisprudence. In the famous Griswold case, the Court struck down a state 
ban on the use of contraceptives by enunciating the “notions of privacy surrounding the 
marital relationship.”91 This decision split off procreation from marriage by giving 
married individuals a constitutional right to prevention of conception.92 In dicta, the 
opinion ended with language that has been widely quoted since:  
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not 
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths, a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an 
 
88 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  
89 Id., at 401-2 (using as an example the arrangement in Plato's Republic where wives and children 
were held in common). 
90 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  
91 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1942). 
92 Id. Many years later in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court made this severance between 
marriage and procreation even clearer. Jamal Greene, case Comment: Divorcing Marriage from 
Procreation, 114 YALE L.J. 1989, 1996 (2005).  
The Turner Court had to evaluate whether prisoners – prisoners! – with 
no procreative justification still have a fundamental right to marry, and 
it held unanimously that they do. The case demonstrates, therefore, that 
marriage is fundamental under the U.S. Constitution not because it 
provides a setting for heterosexual procreation but because it 
solemnizes a social relationship that individuals regard as 
fundamentally important. 
Id. Turner also de-linked marriage from privacy because prisoners do not enjoy constitutionally-protected 
privacy rights. Carlos A. Ball, Symposium: Gay Rights after Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 
1202 (2004).  
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association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.93 
The Loving case two years later in 1967 finally made it explicit: the Due Process 
Clause includes marriage as a constitutional liberty because “[t]he freedom to marry has 
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.”94 As had become a pattern in the Court’s decision, the reference 
to the “freedom to marry” was absolutely dicta.95 
Over the next eleven years, the Court referenced the right or freedom to marry 
multiple times96 before Justice Marshall wrote what is now considered to be the right to 
marry case.97 In Zablocki, the Court overturned a state statute denying a marriage license 
to anyone not current on child support payments.98 Marshall said that the state must not 
prevent poor people from marrying,99 distinguishing Califano100 (upholding a federal law 
terminating Social Security benefits if one married a person ineligible for the same 
benefits) by indicating that the government may impose “reasonable regulations that do 
 
93 Griswold, supra note 91, at 485-86. 
 
94 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 
95 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (Loving “could have rested solely on the ground 
that the statutes discriminated on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also 
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 81 (1989) (“But for this expansive rhetoric, which . . . went beyond what 
the decision of the case at hand actually required, Loving v. Virginia would have been an unremarkable 
application of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .But with this language, the case casts doubt on the validity 
of much state regulation of marriage.”). 
96 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 383 (1971) (court fees may not be used to prevent 
poor persons from filing for divorce); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“[O]nly personal 
rights that can be deemed `fundamental' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in 
this guarantee of personal privacy . . ..  [This personal privacy] right has some extension to activities 
relating to marriage . . .”); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (“This 
Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of 
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“The Court has long recognized that freedom of 
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); and Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 
(1977) (“The individuals' freedom to marry and reproduce is `older than the Bill of Rights'”). But see 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (federal government is allowed to penalize a person for marrying, 
upholding federal law terminating Social Security benefits if one married a person ineligible for the same 
benefits).  
97 Zablocki, supra note 95. 
98 Id.
99 Id. at 386-87. 
20
not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship . . .”101 
Important for our purposes was Marshall's statement that the “Social Security provisions 
[in Califano] placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married, 
and . . . there was no evidence that the laws significantly discourage[d] . . . any 
marriages.”102 
While government is normally prevented from interfering with practices often 
associated with the personal aspects of marriage (sexual behavior, childrearing, living 
arrangements), government has a long-recognized right to adjust and regulate the 
consequences of marriage (intestacy, testate inheritance, child support, divorce). 
Zablocki, then, provides a constitutional overlay with which any proposed deathbed 
marriage solution must comply. Solutions that prevent or severely limit deathbed 
marriages, or retroactively revoke the legitimacy of the marriage itself, may be suspect 
under Marshall's reasoning.103 
On the other hand, solutions that sever the property consequences of marriage from 
the legitimacy of the marriage itself seem to meet what I am calling the Califano 
exception to Zablocki.104 
VI. Solutions  
It is but reasonable that these unhappy persons, who are prohibited by law 
from making any binding contract for the merest pecuniary trifle, should 
be protected from the effects of a covenant of so high a nature, which 
never could be entered into by the other party without some base or 
sinister design. If it would be hard that the issue of such marriages should 
 
100 See Califano, supra note 96. 
101 Id. at 386. 
102 Id. at 387 n.12. 
103 Note that if ever challenged under Zablocki, New York's approach – referenced in Part VI (B) and 
notes 111 and 112, infra – might well be struck down. 
104 One such example can be found in In the Matter of the Estate of Buel Epperson, 679 S.W.2d 792 
(Ark. 1984), cert. denied Epperson v. Estate of Epperson, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985). In an opinion written by 
the now-infamous Webb Hubbell when he was Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, the court 
ruled a statute constitutional, against a fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge, that precluded a 
spouse from asserting a dower or curtesy right by taking against a will unless that spouse had been married 
to the decedent continuously for a period in excess of one year. Epperson at 793. “Individual and 
government interests in this limitation include discouragement of deathbed marriages, and the classification 
bears a rational relationship to that objective.” Id. at 794.  
For a number of reasons, however, I do not support such a bright-line rule in deciding property 
consequences. I argue only for the ability of heirs to have standing to challenge the property rights of a 
marriage after the death of one of the parties within a reasonable period of time after the marriage.  
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be deemed bastards, it would be as much so that human beings without 
reason, or their families, should be the victims of the artifice of desperate 
persons who might be willing to speculate on their misfortunes.105 
A. Possible Solutions 
There are numerous potential solutions that might address the “problem” of deathbed 
marriages, and the attendant consequences of property disposition at death, including: (1) 
requiring more safeguards in the marriage process itself to help deter undue influence and 
ensure sufficient capacity (requiring more witnesses, videotaping of the ceremony, the 
attendance of medical professionals, the assignment of mandatory guardians at litem); (2) 
increasing the capacity required to marry, perhaps to the level of testamentary capacity; 
(3) shifting to a presumption of incapacity if one party dies within a certain amount of 
time after the wedding; (4) adopting Uniform Probate Code elective share principles that 
give a surviving spouse very little or nothing by right if the marriage lasts less than a 
certain amount of time;106 and (5) prohibiting weddings in hospitals and similar facilities. 
Certainly, there are likely many more options along these lines.  
One simple solution listed above that should be discussed in a bit more detail is to 
require some period of time that the union must last in order to receive the property rights 
flowing from the marriage. For example, in some circumstances, the federal government 
uses one year as the appropriate balance: in order to receive federal social security 
surviving spouse benefits, the couple must have been validly married for a year.107 Some 
states have similar rules.108 
The reasoning behind such policies seems both fiscal (the time requirement tends to 
limit the number of claims) and deterrent in nature (decreasing the incentive for an end-
of-life marriage designed simply to obtain this and other financial benefits flowing from 
being married). While good reasons undoubtedly exist, this type of bright-line solution 
smacks of being arbitrary and would be over-inclusive. There are many reasons why 
people die, and it is probably the exception rather than the rule that both parties to a 
marriage would know that death was imminent. Certainly for unforeseen deaths, there 
seems no legitimate policy argument supporting the automatic revocation of marital 
property rights if one of the parties lives less than a certain amount of time. (Indeed, the 
social security code should probably be revisited in this regard.)  
 
105 In Middleborough v. Rochester, 12 Mass. 363 (1815). 
106 Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-204 through 2-207 (1990). 
107 See 24 U.S.C. §§ 416(b)(2), (c)(1)(E), (f)(2) and (g)(1)(E). There are several other ways to qualify 
as well. For example, the one-year requirement is waived if surviving and decedent spouses have at least 
one child together. See 24 U.S.C. §§ 416(b)(1), (c)(1)(A), (f)(1) and (g)(1)(A).  
108 For example, Minnesota state law requires that a public employee be married for a year before 
certain survivor benefits will be paid. MINN. STAT., § 353.657, subdivision 1 (2006). 
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States should not rush to change the fundamental system of requirements they have in 
place to determine the validity of marriages, and it is quite possible that many of the 
above solutions may face federal and state constitutional challenges as violative of the 
“fundamental right to marry.” 
The recommended solution proposed below, on the other hand, does not require such 
fundamental changes, nor does it infringe on one's right to marry. It suggests only a 
change in the standing requirements as to who may sue and when, leaving intact the body 
of a state's laws – both statutory and judge-made – surrounding the requirements for, and 
validity of, marriages.  
And finally, why exactly should there be anything preventing one of proper capacity, 
under no duress or other physical or mental impairments (all key points to my argument), 
to marry on their deathbed for the sole reason of providing all the property rights that 
flow from marriage to a beloved other? As the Supreme Court of Washington put it in 
1927:  
Much stress has been laid by the appellant upon the 
claimed fact that the marriage alone almost conclusively 
shows incompetency upon the part of the decedent. It is 
said that for a woman who is in her last sickness to marry a 
man [thirty] years her junior is, to say the least, unnatural. 
But this must depend upon the circumstances of the case. 
We have already noticed that for several years he had lived 
most of the time at her home; that he had cared for her 
during all of her sickness; that she was not on good terms 
with her relatives in this country; that she did not wish 
them to inherit any of her property; that she had expressed 
a desire that Donohue should have it all; and that for 
several years she had wished to marry him. Under such 
circumstances it would not be unnatural if she desired to 
marry him for the sole purpose that he might inherit 
through her. Instances of such conduct, while not common, 
are not at all unknown. Marriage sometimes takes place 
upon the death bed of one of the parties, with full 
knowledge of the participants that neither of them will ever 
be able to be a spouse in other than name, and that for a 
very short space of time, perhaps but a few minutes. But 
the right to contract such a marriage, if the mind is capable 
of contracting, has never been denied. 
The world at large may look askance at such a union, but 
the law, which does not concern itself with the incongruity 
thereof, looks only to the question of legal obstacles, and, if 
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none there be, must sanction it as within the rights of the 
parties to contract if they see fit.109 
B. Recommended Solution 
States and the federal government create, generally by statute, all of the property 
rights associated with marriage. Presumably, government could sever these rights from a 
marriage under certain prescribed circumstances, leaving the marriage intact but stripping 
away the property consequences.110 New York state, in fact, does just this (though in a 
different way than I would recommend). While there are many grounds for annulling a 
marriage in New York that make a union void and not voidable (allowing heirs to 
challenge a marriage post-death),111 the surviving spouse's right to elect against the will 
or take via intestacy is not disturbed even if a marriage is annulled post-death.112 I would 
argue, however, that the opposite should be true for policy reasons, and as pointed out in 
Part V note 103, supra, if New York's approach were ever challenged by a clever 
attorney using Zablocki, it might well be ruled unconstitutional.  
Two classes of individuals should have standing to contest the property consequences 
of a marriage after the death of one of the spouses. First are the heirs under state law, i.e.,
those individuals who would take some portion of the decedent's property if she died 
intestate (without a will). Second, if the decedent died with a valid (or arguably valid) 
will, then those individuals who take property under the will would also have standing.  
In no instance would this proposal allow an action to nullify the marriage itself. I 
would simply allow post-death attacks on the property consequences flowing from the 
marriage.  
 
109 In re Donahue's Estate. Norling v. Heintz et al., 255 P.370 (Wash 1927) (emphasis added).  
110 This has been done for various reasons throughout history, including one very interesting deathbed 
marriage legislative effort – detailed in Appendix 3 – in colonial Hong Kong near the close of the 
nineteenth century. In modern America, a handful of states have bestowed many of the state-law based 
marital property consequences of marriage to same-sex couples who enter into civil unions that are not 
recognized as marriages as that term has been traditionally used. 
111 See N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 140 (suit to annul a marriage based on mental incompetence, fraud, duress, or 
consent by force may be maintained by a relative of the impaired party even after the death of said party). 
112 See Bennett v. Thomas, 327 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (even where decedent's sons, 
suing individually and as executors of their mother's estate, alleged with sufficient proof a cause of action 
to avoid their mother's marriage to her surviving husband, this would not defeat the surviving husband's 
election right) (citing EPTL 5-1.2(a) (1)). 
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As discussed above,113 most states stratify required capacity into three categories: (1) 
contractual capacity (highest); (2) testamentary capacity (middling); and (3) marital 
capacity (lowest).  
If the plaintiff can show by an appropriate evidentiary standard that the decedent 
spouse did not have testamentary capacity (middle level of the three) at the time of the 
marriage, then all property consequences flowing from the marriage would be 
invalidated, including, but not limited to, the elective share (which is relevant in all 
separate property jurisdictions but Georgia114). If the decedent dies without a valid will, 
then she will be deemed, for the purposes of determining property rights, to have died 
intestate and unmarried. If she dies with a valid115 will, then the elective share law (or 
community property law) will not be applicable, and the decedent will again be deemed 
to have died testate and unmarried for purposes of determining property rights. 
Obviously, any other contractual documents executed during this state of diminished 
capacity will be void as well, since all would likely require a higher level of capacity than 
testamentary capacity. This might include the execution of a trust, deed, or a document 
purporting to make a gift.  
The logic for such a regime flows as follows: If the decedent spouse did not have 
testamentary capacity, she could not have executed a valid will. If one cannot understand 
the property consequences of a will, then one cannot understand the property 
consequences that flow from marriage (though one may very well understand other less 
complicated consequences of marriage).  
If, on the other hand, the decedent is adjudged to have had testamentary (middling) 
capacity but not contractual (highest) capacity, then the property benefits flowing from 
marriage such as the elective share should be allowed. If the decedent spouse had the 
ability to understand and execute a will (even if she did not in fact execute a will), then in 
theory she would have had the ability to understand the property consequence of 
marriage. This approach would not, however, validate any documents executed during 
the time of the marriage that require contractual (highest) capacity. This would include 
the execution of trusts, deeds, gift instruments, etc.  
 
113 MARITAL CAPACITY < TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY < CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY – See discussion in 
Part IV and note 65, supra.
114 See generally, Turnipseed supra note 12. 
115 To be valid, of course, the will must have been signed at a time when the testator had testamentary 
capacity, which, as discussed, is generally greater than marital capacity. Thus, if the will in question is 
signed roughly at the same time as the marriage and the testator is adjudged not to have had the capacity 
required under my approach (testamentary capacity), then by definition the will is invalid. Of course, in 
some circumstances in some jurisdictions, it is possible that a prior will signed at a time when the testator 
did have the requisite testamentary capacity would then be revived. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra 
note 11, at 267-69. 
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Finally, if the surviving spouse wins the battle and the decedent spouse is adjudged to 
have had contractual capacity, then no property consequences of the marriage should be 
disturbed and all documents executed during this time should be validated.  
In any of the above scenarios, there should be some sort of statute of limitations for 
challenging the property consequences of marriage. In determining the proper length of 
time, there is a balancing between certainty of property distributions in an estate and 
equity to the heirs who, perhaps, should not be expected to act immediately upon the 
marriage or death of, for example, a parent. Perhaps a year from the date of the marriage 
(not the death) would be an appropriate balance. Of course, the property consequences of 
the marriage may be challenged during the lives of both spouses as well as after the death 
of a spouse. 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
should work to prepare a model act for adoption by the states and the District of 
Columbia. 
This proposed solution would negate any “fundamental right to marriage” arguments 
since the marriage would remain valid. This solution also does not disturb a state's long-
established body of law surrounding a marriage’s requirements and validity.  
VII. Conclusion  
There is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.116 
Individuals on their deathbeds have just as much right to marry as anyone, and if 
competent and under no duress, the parties to the marriage certainly should have 
protection under the law. This protection should be appropriately shaped to avoid 
harassment of widows and widowers.  
Having said that, I simply cannot see a valid argument for not allowing a decedent-
spouse's heirs (those who would take the decedent's property if he or she died unmarried 
and intestate) and beneficiaries (those who would take under the decedent's valid will, if 
any, absent a spousal election) the right to challenge the property consequences of a 
suspect marriage based on traditional grounds that might naturally flow from a deathbed 
marriage. 
It is only reasonable that these poor people, who may well not have the legal capacity 
to make a contract for the smallest monetary value, and their heirs and beneficiaries 
should have state protection against a surviving spouse taking some or all of the 
decedent's property: protection against a surviving spouse who might seem to have few 
legitimate motives to enter into a deathbed marriage. 
 
116 ANTON MENGER, DAS BUGERLICHE RECHT UND DIE BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN 30 (4th ed., 1908). 
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The current incentives are off kilter. A greedy potential spouse has every incentive to 
try to find a minister or officer of the law willing to marry them off to a wealthy sick 
person and no legal incentives not to try it. Upon the death of one of the spouses, the 
marriage becomes set in stone with no person other than the surviving spouse – no matter 
how ugly the situation – given standing to seek redress in a court of law. Allowing, in an 
appropriate way, heirs and beneficiaries to challenge the property consequences of a 
suspect marriage puts in place the proper disincentives to think twice before attempting to 
take advantage of one of feeble mind and spirit.  
If the property consequences are allowed to stand, victims will continue to abound in 
deathbed marriage situations where consent is lacking: the decedent, her family, and 
society generally. Just imagine how you would feel losing an expectancy in such 
circumstances. 
Let each state legislature enact such a deathbed marriage act sooner rather than later. 
Only then can the ghosts of the Herbert Hafts, and their heirs and beneficiaries, finally 
rest in peace. 
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Appendix 1 – Harper’s Weekly Deathbed Marriage Cartoon 
Harper's Weekly provided the following explanation of the cartoon:  
The Death-Bed Marriage of Greeley's Liberal-
Republicanism to The Daughter of Democracy took place 
at the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore on 
July 10, 1872, and was duly celebrated in this grim 
caricature. Longtime Republican Horace Greeley kneels to 
take, for better or worse, the moribund hand of the 
Democratic Party, which has nominated him as its 
presidential candidate. The sarcastic use of “Nigger” in the 
subtitle refers to an 1868 Nast cartoon, “Would You Marry 
Your Daughter to a Nigger?” which wondered if the anti-
black Democratic Party might nominate civil rights veteran, 
Salmon Chase. (They did not.) Here, the term refers to 
Greeley, the former abolitionist, and underscores the 
abandonment of his principles.  
In the left-foreground the Democratic/woman's dowry of 
“Fraudulent Votes,” “Stuffed Ballot Boxes,” and 
“Tammany Ring Money Stolen From the People” is 
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stacked in crates and boxes. Complementing the unhappy 
couple, an equally mismatched and grotesque wedding 
party of grieving Tammanyites, Democrats, and embittered 
Liberal Republicans are gathered to endure the moment. 
Behind Greeley on the right, Whitelaw Reid is holding the 
former editor's trademark white hat and coat; the pocket of 
the latter contains a publication, “The Recollections of a 
Busy-Body, By H. G.” 
The longhaired figure on the far right is Theodore Tilton, 
editor, evangelist, and lecturer. In his jacket pocket is a 
book, Life of Mrs. Woodhull, a biography Tilton had 
written about Victoria Claflin Woodhull. She was an 
outspoken advocate of women's rights and free love, who 
in 1872 became the first woman nominated for president 
(running on the ticket of the Equal Rights Party). Shortly 
before the election, she revealed evidence of an affair 
between Tilton's wife and the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, 
perhaps the most popular and well-known evangelist in the 
country. The scandalous revelations led to one of the 
nation's most widely-reported and sensational trials.117 
117 John Adler [Publisher], Cartoonist Thomas Nast v. Candidate Horace Greeley: the Election of 1871 
in Harper’s Weekly, http://nastandgreeley.harpweek.com/SubPages/cartoon-1872-
mediumB.asp?UniqueID=17&Year=election. 
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Appendix 2 – George Orwell’s Deathbed Marriage 
Writer George Orwell married Sonia Brownell, a woman fifteen years younger than 
Orwell, on his deathbed. The marriage “prompted a frisson of suspicion among 
friends.”118 Sonia was apparently quite the character. She “had slept her way around 
London's intellectual haut monde” and was at Orwell's side “wearing an extravagant ring 
of rubies and diamonds bought with one of [Orwell's] blank cheques.”119 Orwell had a 
son from a previous marriage, the mother of whom had died unexpectedly.120 Thus, 
instead of Orwell's royalties from Animal Farm and 1984 passing to his son, they went to 
Sonia (though the latter point is a complex tale in itself).121 Carroll summarized Sonia's 
activities around the time of Orwell's death as follows:  
Famously, of course, while Orwell was dying, Sonia was 
drinking with her former beau, the painter Lucian Freud. 
Since then she has been portrayed as more of a merry 
widow than a grieving one: setting off for the Riviera when 
her husband's body was barely cold, to pursue the real love 
of her life, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty; 
frittering Orwell's fortune on failed affairs and booze, dying 
a destitute and bitter drunk.122 
118 Tim Carroll, A Writer Wronged, THE SUNDAY TIMES, August 15, 2004. 
 
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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Appendix 3 – Separation of Validity of Marriage from Marital Property 
Rights in Colonial Hong Kong 
Apparently, it was very common for European men who were economically active in 
Hong Kong during this era to keep a paid mistress.123 Indeed, one police estimate in 1880 
stated that seventy to eighty percent of women in Hong Kong were prostitutes or “women 
of easy virtue.”124 Many dying men would marry their mistress “to make up for their past 
misdeeds as they prepared to meet their maker.”125 The Attorney General of Hong Kong 
put into place a regime that appeared to sever the relationship between marriage and the 
property consequences thereof:  
The rule in this colony and in England is that a marriage 
revokes a will. The Secretary of State has directed that if 
this Ordinance was introduced there should be a provision 
inserted that a deathbed marriage should not have the effect 
of revoking a will. The Secretary of State has not exactly 
stated what his reasons are but I could very well imagine 
myself that a man might be under the influence of religious 
fervour and do possibly what his religious advisers or 
priests may tell him is his duty, and it is thought fit that a 
marriage under such circumstances should not revoke any 
previous provision which he had made possibly in good 
health for the benefit of his family or relatives.126 
123 www.blogthetalk.com/2005/12/hong-kongs-deathbed-marriages.html. 
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